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CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND ERRoR-RGHT OF REvmnw-WHETHER ATTORNEY ORDERED
To WITHDRAw FROM CASE HAS SUCH AN INTEREST IN THE SmJECT MATTER
AS TO ENTITLE HIM TO APPEAL FROM SUCH ORDER-In Almon v. American
Carloading Corporation' the Illinois Supreme Court for the first time
held that an attorney who had been found disqualified to represent the
parties in a pending case could not appeal from such order as he had no
such interest in the judgment or decree to be rendered on the merits of
the controversy as would be required to support an appeal. It was also
held that such order was not a final order within the meaning of Sec-
tion 77 of the Civil Practice Act,2 nor was it one of those interlocutory
orders which, under Section 78 thereof, 3 are appealable. In that pro-
ceeding certain members of a labor union sued their employer and the
union officials for withholding checks allegedly belonging to plaintiffs.
The union officials directed the attorney retained by the union, toward
whose pay each union member contributed a fixed amount, to represent
the union officials in the suit. The plaintiffs sought to have him removed
as attorney on the theory that he represented each of them through his
arrangement with the union and hence was disqualified from appearing
on behalf of a part of the members in any proceeding involving a dispute
with other members thereof. The trial court so held, but on appeal to
the Appellate Court for the First District such order was reversed on
the ground that the union, as such, had a separate juristic person-
ality from its members so that the relationship of attorney and client
had never existed between the attorney in question and the plaintiffs.
4
On further review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with di-
rections to dismiss the appeal.
Prior to the Civil Practice Act, one not a party to the suit had no
right to appeal,5 but a person not a party of record had a right to review
by writ of error if he could show an interest in the judgment or decree
to be reviewed. 6 Though the writ of error is now abolished,7 the right
1 380 IMl. 524, 44 N.E. (2d) 592 (1942.), reversing 312 Ill. App. 225, 38 N. E. (2d)
362 (1941), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvEw 10.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 201.
3 Ibid., § 202. It was urged that the order expelling the attorney possessed the
elements of restraint, so as to be of the same character as an interlocutory order
for injunction. It was held that such was not the case, since the latter is designed
to preserve the status quo of the merits of the case, whereas the former had no
bearing thereon.
4 The Supreme Court, having granted leave to appeal, refrained from discussing
whether or not the union was a separate entity from the members on the ground
that that issue was neither before it nor before the appellate court. That question
is, therefore, still open to debate. See, on that point, Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Associated Milk Dealers, 42 F. Supp. 584 (1941).
5 People ex rel. Galloway v. Franklin County Building Association, 329 Ill. 582,
161 N. E. 56 (1928).
6 People ex rel. Yohnka v. Kennedy, 367 Ill. 236, 10 N. E. (2d) 806 (1937).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 198.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of a person not a party to the proceedings to secure review of the judg-
ment or decree is preserved by Section 81 of the Civil Practice Act.8
According to the holding in the instant case, however, such right has,
in no way, been enlarged, consequently any person seeking review under
that section must clearly disclose the interest upon which he relies to
support his right of appeal. If, under the former practice, no such right
existed because the person complaining was neither a party to the rec-
ord, one injured by the judgment, one who would be benefited by its
reversal, nor one competent to release errors, it follows no such right
exists today.
Cases dealing with the immediate factual problem found in the in-
stant case are, fortunately, rare, since the ethics of the profession forbid
an attorney retained by one side of a case from appearing on behalf of
the other parties. The somewhat analogous problem of the right of an
attorney to act as counsel and thereafter to seek a court order for an
allowance of fees as compensation for his services has, however, been
adjudicated many times. Whether any such order is open to attack at
the instance of the attorney depends on the question as to the nature of
such allowance. If made to the attorney directly, he is a person "injured
by the judgment or who will be benefited by its reversal" in the event
the trial court rejects such application, hence is competent to appeal. 9
If, however, the allowance is made to the successful party, as to reim-
burse him for counsel's fees paid or to be paid, the attorney is not such
a person affected by the allowance or disallowance thereof as to justify
his appeal therefrom ° any more than he would be entitled to carry on
an appeal in his own name in behalf of any disappointed client.1 If the
right to seek compensation for work done is not sufficient to support an
appeal, it is rather difficult to see how an attorney could contend that an
order preventing him from rendering such service, even assuming it to
be a final order, should warrant him maintaining an appeal therefrom.
8 Ibid., § 205, specifically recites that: "The right heretofore possessed by any
person not a party to the record to review a judgment or decree by writ of error
shall be preserved by notice of appeal."
9 In re Riviere's Estate, 7 Cal. App. 755, 96 P. 16 (1908); Louden v. Louden,
65 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 411 (1883).
10 Anderson v. Steger, 173 Ili. 112, 50 N. E. 665 (1898), affirming sub. nom. Steger
v. Steger, 67 Ill. App. 533 (1896); Appeal of Pereyra, 126 Pa. 220, 17 A. 602 (1889).
11 Besancon v. Brownson, 39 Mich. 388 (1878).
